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INTRODUCTION

Professors Nielsen and Albiston revisit the 1978 article, The
Public Interest Law Industry, by Joel F. Handler, Betsy Ginsberg, and
Arthur Snow, which presents an empirical study of the public interest
law ("PIL") industry in the mid-1970s.1 At that time, there were only
eighty-six PIL firms or public interest law organizations ("PILOs") in
existence in the United States.2 Then, PILOs tended to be small, had
relatively small operating budgets, received most of their funds from
private sources, and tended to focus most of their effort in a single
substantive area, among other characteristics noted by Professors
Nielsen and Albiston. However, there have been significant changes
in the legal, political, social, and economic landscape since the mid1970s, so one would expect PILOs to have changed significantly as
well. Nielsen and Albiston's study is therefore a timely and important
empirical reassessment of PILOs. The primary goals of their study
are to understand how PILOs have changed between 1975 and 2004
and to address the related question "whether public interest

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Faculty Research
Fellow, William Davidson Institute, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of
Michigan. I am grateful to Professors Richard Lempert and Daria Roithmayr for helpful
comments and suggestions.
1. Joel F. Handler et al., The Public Interest Law Industry, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 42, 42-79 (Burton A. Weisbrod et

al. eds., 1978).
2. Id. at 50.
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lawyering with PILOs [has] changed dramatically."3 To those ends,
they replicate the Handler et al. study using PILO data from 2004.

Professors Nielsen and Albiston present several findings. Most
notably, they find that, since 1975, the number of PILOs has
increased by roughly tenfold 4 the ratio of lawyers to non-lawyers in
PILOs has dramatically declined,' PILOs now perform a broader
range of activities beyond litigation in more diverse practice areas,6

and, of particular note to the authors, PILOs increasingly advocate
"conservative" causes.'

The authors' findings seem generally consistent with what one
would expect in light of the various legal, political, social, and

economic changes that have occurred between the 1970s and the
present. Therefore, I have no quarrel with the general tenor of their
findings. Indeed, I think that they demonstrate some very important

organizational trends among PILOs over the past thirty years and
raise crucial questions for further research. However, their sample

selection

methodology is somewhat problematic,

thus raising

questions about the comparability of the 1975 and 2004 PILO data.

In turn, this raises additional interpretive questions concerning some
of their findings. Part I of this Comment discusses these related
issues. Next, Part II offers some suggestions about how Professors
Nielsen and Albiston might further analyze their data to present a
more complete picture of contemporary PILOs, especially regarding
how PILOs' current activities and areas of focus relate to the

incentives and constraints that they presently face. Finally, Part III

3. Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The OrganizationalEnvironment of
Public Interest Practice: 1975-2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1598 (2006).
4. Nielsen & Albiston estimate there were about one thousand PILOs in 2000
compared to the eighty-six PILOs that Handler et al. identified in the mid-1970s. See
Handler et al., supra note 1, at 50; Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1605-06.
5. See Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1608-09.
6. Professors Nielson and Albiston find that PILOs spend relatively more time on
research, education, and outreach than they did in the mid-1970s, suggesting a deemphasis on litigation as a social change strategy. Id. at 1612-15.
7. See id. at 1615-16 (describing "conservative" causes as consisting of "promoting
traditional values, free market/free enterprise, law and order, and protecting property
rights"). Professors Nielsen and Albiston's other findings are that PILOs are much larger
on average than they were in 1975, although most PILOs are still of modest size, see id. at
1606-08, average operating budgets of PILOs have increased dramatically between 1975
and 2000, although many PILOs are still relatively resource scarce, see id. at 1609-11,
PILOs' reliance on public funding (especially state and local government funding) has
increased relative to their reliance on private funding, see id. at 1616, and federally funded
PILOs tend to be large and to provide more direct legal services than do non-federally
funded PILOs, although most PILOs still do not rely on federal funds, see id. at 1617-18.
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discusses the contextual background to their findings and raises a few
questions for further inquiry.
I. SAMPLE SELECTION, COMPARABILITY, AND INTERPRETATION

In constructing their 1975 sample of PILOs, Handler et al.
defined public interest law firms as organizations that: (1) are part of
the voluntary sector; (2) use mainly legal tools such as litigation; and
(3) pursue actions that potentially have substantial external benefits
(public interest).8 Handler et al. found eighty-six PILOs that satisfied
this definition.' In constructing the 2000 sample, Professors Nielsen
and Albiston utilize the following definition of a PILO:
"organizations in the voluntary sector ...whose activities (1) seek to
produce significant benefits for those who are external to the
organization's participants, and (2) involve at least one adjudicatory
strategy."1 Based on this sampling definition, 1 they estimate that
there were more than a thousand PILOs in the United States in 2000;
hence their finding of a more than tenfold increase in the number of
PILOs since 1975. However, are the 1975 and the 2004 samples truly
comparable? By their own admission, the authors' "definition [of
PILO] is broader than just traditional public interest firms."12 To
what extent do they discern more PILOs (and thus overestimate the
growth rate of PILOs) simply by virtue of the fact that they use a
broader definition than the definition that Handler et al. use in their
study?
In turn, this issue raises additional questions about the authors'
interpretation of their findings. For example, based on their findings
of an increase in the non-attorney to attorney ratio and the increased
diversification of PILO activities away from strictly legal work, 3 the
8. Handler et al., supra note 1, at 49.
9. Id. at 50.
10. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1601.
11. See id. at 1603-05 (describing Nielsen and Albiston's sampling methodology).
12. Id. at 1601 n.51.
13. Presumably, it makes sense for PILOs to utilize a greater proportion of nonattorneys than in the past, when PILOs tended to specialize more heavily in legal work,
particularly if non-attorneys can do non-legal work just as well as, but more cheaply, than
lawyers. The increase in the number of non-attorneys relative to attorneys might also be
due to the shift in ideological focus of PILOs toward more conservative causes, to the
extent that conservative PILOs "are mostly think tanks and lobbying groups that do not
engage in litigation." See John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients,
Ideology, and Social Distance, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 5, 18 (2003). But see Ann
Southworth, The Rights Revolution and Support Structures for Rights Advocacy, 34 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 1203, 1215 (2000) (arguing that "[a]t a time when many activists on the left
have lost confidence in litigation as a vehicle for social change, activists on the right are
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authors conclude that PILOs were different organizations in 1975 and
2004. However, these two findings might be, in part, the result of the
authors' sample selection. That is, since the authors' definition of
PILOs is broader than Handler et al.'s definition, by construction
their sample might be biased toward showing a different
organizational structure than the structure that Handler et al. found.

To what extent is their sample by deliberate construction more
representative of what Handler et al. refer to as PINLOs
(public
14
interest non-law organizations), as opposed to PILOs?
Table 4 raises another comparability issue.

In Table 4, the

authors present statistics on PILOs' "efforts devoted to twelve topical
areas: civil liberties, environment, consumer protection, employment,
education, media reform, health, welfare, housing, voting,
occupational safety and health, and other."15 These are the original
substantive areas that Handler et al. considered.16 To these original
topical categories, Professors Nielsen and Albiston add four new

categories that reflect a more conservative agenda:

"promoting

traditional values, free market/free enterprise, law and order, and
protecting property rights."17 They then examine PILOs' allocation
of effort across the sixteen practice areas and find that there is less
topical specialization among PILOs: "In 1975, over one quarter

(29%) of PILOs were single-issue organizations; by 2004, that
number had dropped to 7%."18 This seems reasonable based on the
data presented in Table 4.
However, the authors' claim that the data in Table 4 show that
PILOs are increasingly dedicated to conservative agendas is more
investing heavily in strategic litigation"). However, Nielsen and Albiston do not present
their data in a manner that shows the relationship among PILO ideology, activities, and
the ratio of non-attorneys to attorneys, a point that I return to in Part II. Or, it might
simply be that "PILOs are adopting the practices of other law firms and legal departments
to leverage lawyers and entrust much work to non-lawyers." Nielsen & Albiston, supra
note 3, at 1609.
14. Handler et al. define PINLOs as "organizations in the voluntary sector that are
engaged principally in public interest non-law (PINL) activities ... [including] organizing
individuals to act on their common interests; gathering, analyzing, and disseminating
information through publications and seminars; lobbying legislatures and agencies in the
public sector; and providing information to decision-makers." Handler et al., supra note 1,
at 73. In fact, Handler et al. noted that the distinction between PILOs and PINLOs "is
often a matter of degree ... [but they] have chosen here to keep the two distinct." Id.
Professors Nielsen and Albiston seem to make a less clear distinction between these two
types of organizations and that might drive their findings.
15. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1613, 1614 tbl.4.
16. Handler et al., supra note 1, at 53.
17. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1615.
18. Id.

HeinOnline -- 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1626 2005-2006

2006]

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE "HA VE-NOTS"

1627

problematic. Since Handler et al. did not consider the four additional
conservative categories, Professors Nielsen's and Albiston's data do
not directly prove that PILOs are more dedicated to conservative
agendas than they were in the past, although there is compelling
evidence elsewhere suggesting that this is the case. 9 The last row of
Table 4 illustrates that in 1975 all but 9% of PILO effort was devoted
to the eleven original topical areas that Handler et al. considered. In
fact, Handler et al. labeled this 9% unexplained effort as "other."" ° In
contrast, in Table 4, Nielsen and Albiston find that 15% of PILO
effort is unexplained, which they label as "other." However, the two
samples are not directly comparable because Nielsen and Albiston
have added the four new conservative topical areas (described above)
to Handler et al.'s eleven original topical areas. It is at least
conceivable that at least some of the 9% "other" effort that Handler
et al. found in 1975 consisted of what Professors Nielsen and Albiston
refer to as conservative causes (i.e., their four new categories, which
represent 13% of PILO effort in their 2004 data). If that is the case,
their data might overstate the case for a shift in emphasis among
PILOs to conservative causes.21 On the other hand, their data might
understate such a shift to the extent that their "other" category
includes additional conservative causes.
Ideally, the authors would have used both panel data, that is,
data in which the same PILOs are followed over time, and data on

19. See Timothy L. Foden, The Battle for Public Interest Law: Exploring the
Orwellian Nature of the Freedom Based Public Interest Movement, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
210, 212-18 (2005) (detailing the history of the expansion of the freedom-based

"conservative public interest legal movement"); Heinz et al., supra note 13, at 35-40
(discussing the "building of an infrastructure of resources and organizations to advance
conservative goals"); Karen O'Conner & Lee Epstein, The Rise of Conservative Interest
Group Litigation, 45 J. POL. 479, 481-83 (1983) (presenting evidence that there has been
an increase in conservative interest group litigation since the early 1970s); Ann
Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of "Public Interest
Law," 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1241 (2005) (noting that "[t]he first organizations to call
themselves conservative public interest law organizations ... appeared in the mid-1970s,"
which was precisely the period of the Handler et al. study); Southworth, supra note 13, at
1215.
20. The eleven original topical areas that Handler et al. considered included: civil
liberties, environmental protection, consumer protection, employment, education, media
reform, health care, welfare benefits, housing, voting, and occupational health and safety.
They also included a twelfth category, which they labeled "other." Handler et al., supra
note 1, at 53, 57 tbl.4.7.
21. However, there is strong evidence that PILOs devote greater effort to
conservative causes than they did in the mid-1970s. See supra note 19. Thus, my point
here is simply that the authors' data do not necessarily show this increase in conservative
effort, since Handler et al. did not explicitly consider the four conservative categories.
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newer PILOs.22 Panel data would have allowed Professors Nielsen
and Albiston to investigate whether and how the PILOs that existed
in the mid-70s have changed over time. New entrant data would have
allowed them to do what they do now, which is to map the current
scope of PILO activity, and at the same time it would have avoided
confounding the current overall situation with changes within the
older public interest sector over time. The latter information would
have helped to illuminate the dynamics of changes in classic PILO
activity over time. Panel data can be hard to collect, particularly
when one has not done the original research, so I want to be clear
that I am not criticizing Professors Nielsen and Albiston for their
failure to do this. Rather, I want to point out how valuable panel data
can be in research of this sort to encourage future students of PILOs
to include a panel component in their work.

II.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS

This Part offers some suggestions for further analysis of the 2004
PILO data that might enable the authors to tell a more complete
story about the changes among PILOs between 1975 and 2004. In
addition, this Part suggests several additional ways that the authors
might analyze the 2004 data to paint a richer picture of the effects of
the incentives and constraints that PILOs face in the twenty-first
century.
One of the main inferences that the authors draw from their data
is that PILOs have shifted from being agents of "social change for
disadvantaged groups" (e.g., the poor and minorities) to being
"increasingly direct service organizations interested in providing
direct legal services to individual clients ... many that differ from the
traditional poverty and civil rights constituencies of the past. '23 The
authors suggest that there has been a relative shift of emphasis among
PILOs away from poverty and civil rights issues-"traditional" public
interest practice-to mainstream or conservative issues.24 Handler et
al. demonstrated PILOs' substantive emphasis in the mid-1970s in
part by a table equivalent to Nielsen and Albiston's Table 4, discussed
above. However, Handler et al. also examined PILOs' allocation of
effort to various beneficiary groups, finding that "[o]n average, 34
percent of a PIL firm's effort was intended to benefit the general

22.
23.
24.
PILOs.

See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 24 (3d ed. 1995).
Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1593-94.
Id. at 1598. This is in accord with other studies finding an increase in conservative
See supra note 19.
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population, 15 percent the poor, 10 percent women, and the
remaining 41 percent was distributed among all other groups. ' 25 I am
curious as to why Professors Nielsen and Albiston do not also
investigate PILOs' allocation of effort to specific beneficiary groups,
since doing so would allow them more directly to assess whether the
poor and other disadvantaged members of society are being served by
PILOs to a lesser extent than they were in the mid-1970s.26
Although Professors Nielsen's and Albiston's main purpose is to
study the changes in the PILO industry over time, their 2004 data
allow them to give a fuller account of how PILOs respond to the
incentives and constraints that they face and of the increased
heterogeneity among PILOs since the mid-1970s. The following are
some suggestions (in summary form) for how they might further
analyze the 2004 data.
1. PILO budget as a function of PILO size (where size might be
measured as the total number of personnel, for example). In
Table 2, the authors examine the distribution of PILOs by total
operating budget. However, this analysis does not normalize by
PILO size. An arguably more useful measure of resource
constraint is the operating budget available per employee
(lawyer and/or non-lawyer).
2. Distribution of effort among various activities/substantive
areas by PILO size and/or by budget per personnel. In Tables 3
and 4, respectively, the authors examine the distribution of
PILOs by the percent of effort that they devote to various types
of activities (e.g., legal work, legislative work, research,
education, outreach, etc.) and substantive areas (e.g., civil
liberties, environment, education, housing, conservative causes,
etc.). While Tables 3 and 4 facilitate comparison with the same
analyses conducted by Handler et al. on the 1975 data, the
analyses of Tables 3 and 4 do not inform the reader about how
PILOs' activities and substantive areas of focus currently vary
with their size and budget constraints. The authors can tell this
story with their 2004 data.

25. Handler et al., supra note 1, at 59. Handler et al.'s beneficiary groups include the
poor, women, prisoners, children, Blacks, Spanish-speaking people, the mentally impaired,

the elderly, Native Americans, other racial or ethnic minorities, and other. Id. at 58
tbl.4.8.

26. I am not questioning the veracity of this claim. My argument here is simply that
Nielsen's and Albiston's data do not directly prove it.
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3. Distribution of effort among various activities/substantive
areas by funding source (i.e., Legal Services Corporation
("LSC") treatment). The authors suggest that LSC-funded
PILOs operate under a different set of incentives and
constraints than non-LSC-funded PILOs. Thus, presenting the
data in this additional way would allow Professors Nielsen and
Albiston to assess more precisely how the activities and/or
focus areas of LSC-funded PILOs differ from those of nonLSC-funded PILOs.2 7
4. Formal modeling of PILO behavior. Using multivariate
regression analysis 28 or other quantitative techniques, one might
formally model the factors that are associated with or affect
PILO size, budget, or activities. For example, regressing
budget size on variables such as organization size, organization
age, PILO sector, political leanings and the like might have cast
light on those factors that affect the resources PILOs have to
deploy. It may be that holding organizational size and age
constant, conservative PILOs have no more money to spend
than liberal ones, or it may be that they have much more to
spend, or it may be that, everything else held constant,
environmental PILOs on either side have larger budgets than
civil rights oriented PILOs. The modeling problem is not easy
for some variables, like organizational size, are clearly
endogenous, but if the modeling problems could be solved, we
might gain a much better idea of how the PILO sector is
structured and why certain relationships exist in the data.
5. Case studies. In conducting further research, Professors
Nielsen and Albiston might select a few PILOs from their 2000
data and conduct in-depth case studies.29 What they might lose
in generality they might gain in a richer understanding of how
PILOs respond to various incentives and disincentives and, of

27. See Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1617-18 (speculating that LSC-funded
PILOs are doing much more direct legal work and are refraining from reform work, as the

new rules require).
28. Multivariable regression analysis is a statistical method of determining the
relationship between one variable, called the dependent variable, and two or more
explanatory variables. See GUJARATI, supra note 22, at 191.
29. Weisbrod et al. include several specific case studies in their book in addition to the
more general statistics that Handler et al. present. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978)
[hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST LAW].
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own view of the relative

significance of various tools (e.g., litigation vs. non-litigation) of
social change and how that view has changed with the changing
environment within which they operate."

They might also

discover the strategic reasons why some PILOs that represent
the "have-nots" have shifted to non-litigation strategies over

time.
III.

THE BROADER CONTEXT AND FURTHER QUESTIONS

In their introduction, Professors Nielsen and Albiston motivate

their study by recollecting the 1960s civil rights era's optimism for
"law as an instrument for social justice."31 By contrast, in Part II of

the Article, they note the recent shift to "a more conservative agenda
for some PILOs and public interest lawyers."32 However, the authors

do not explicitly discuss the changes that have occurred in the sociolegal context within which PILOs have operated since the 1970s,
which might explain the changed characteristics of PILOs.
What has changed in the socio-legal environment since the
1970s? Republicans' federal electoral successes (reflected in the
victories of Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and
George W. Bush) have led to a rollback of liberal policies and to the
appointment of more conservative judges on the federal bench.
These political changes have been accompanied by massive
deregulation, more lax enforcement of civil rights and equal
30. See discussion infra Part III.
31. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1592. Marc Galanter's seminal article, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974), also provided (cautious) optimism about the role of law for social
change. Galanter posited that the U.S. legal system systematically advantages the
"Haves" against the "Have nots." Id. at 95. The "Haves" are "repeat players ... who are
engaged in many similar litigations over time" and the "Have nots" are "one-shotters,"
"who have only occasional recourse to the courts." Id. at 97. The poor and the
disadvantaged tend to be one-shotters and thus systematically disadvantaged in litigation,
suggesting important limits on the law as a force for progressive social reform. Id. at 10304. The advantaged repeat players are private market actors (e.g., landlords and
corporations) and the government (e.g., welfare agencies). Id. at 97. However, because
they assume many characteristics of repeat players, public interest organizations can level
the playing field and thereby enhance the role of law as a tool of social change. Id. at 14344; see also Beth Harris, Representing Homeless Families: Repeat Player Implementation
Strategies, in IN LITIGATION DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 108 (Herbert
M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) [hereinafter IN LITIGATION] (providing empirical

confirmation of the potentially leveling role of public interest organizations). Note that
Galanter wrote his seminal article in 1974, at roughly the same time as Handler et al.
conducted their empirical study of PILOs.
32. Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 3, at 1598.
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protection by the federal courts, greater activism by conservative
judges,33 cutbacks in public funding for legal services, and a greater
emphasis on the market to allocate goods and services:

Since 1974, movements

seeking less government, fewer

entitlements, increased personal responsibility, and a reduction

in the regulation of wealth and property in favor of greater
reliance on the market have been ascendant and successful ....

In the 1960s and early 1970s, there may have been an
overemphasis on a "rights strategy" and the efficacy of rights to
secure social change .... Since the 1980s, however ... these

rights, and judicial protection for them, have been steadily
eroded by a spate of Supreme Court decisions ... a more

conservative federal judiciary is less aggressive in protecting
on
them, and the Court has placed important new limits
34
Congress's authority even to legislate in support of rights.
CONCLUSION

Professors Nielsen's and Albiston's broad findings-especially
the decreasing emphasis on litigation relative to other activities-are

consistent with these significant changes in the socio-legal context
within which PILOs operate.

For liberals, litigation as a form of

progressive social change seems to have run its course in the postNew Deal/Civil Rights Era. 3

This raises the important question

33. See Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,24 GA. L. REV. 629, 650 (1990); Christopher E. Smith & Avis
Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court'sActivism and the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 53, 76 (1993). But see Foden, supra note 19, at 223 ("What makes the conservative
adoption of litigation so peculiar is the overall sentiment amongst conservatives that
activism, both from lawyers and judges, is normatively bad."); William Kristol, The
Judiciary: Conservatism's Lost Branch, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 133 (1994)
(arguing that even conservative courts tend to aid liberal causes).
34. Introduction to IN LITIGATION, supra note 31, at 1, 7-8; see also sources cited
supra note 19.
35. See Introduction to IN LITIGATION, supra note 31, at 1, 8 ("[L]itigation now
increasingly offers rights only at a discount, if they are obtainable at all .... The result is
that where up until the time Galanter wrote 'Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead' litigation
seemed to constitute a liberal strategy for social progress, today conservatives actively
engage the legal system to further a very different agenda."); Southworth, supra note 19,
at 1266 (noting that although liberal PILOs "may have been optimistic about what they
could achieve through the courts in the 1960s and 1970s, they have since become less
invested in affirmative litigation strategies"). In fact, some legal commentators have
questioned the efficacy of litigation strategies to achieve progressive social change even
during the civil rights era. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:
IntegrationIdeals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,85 YALE L.J. 470
(1976) (discussing the frequent conflict between civil rights lawyers' integration
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whether the "have-nots" are worse off now than they were in the mid1970s. As Weisbrod et al. note in the preface to their book, "it [is]
axiomatic that there are always alternative ways for society to deal
with its economic and other problems. 3 6 The judiciary/litigation is
just one of many alternative avenues for rights/interest expression
and attainment.3 7
Additional channels include the legislature,
administrative agencies, private non-profit organizations (for
example, lobbying groups and think tanks), corporate board rooms,
grassroots social movements, various institutions of civil society that
engage in more direct action, and the media.38 Law and public policy
are debated in and emanate from all of these alternative arenas.39
Indeed, it is possible that some of the PILOs that were litigating in
the 1970s on behalf of the "have-nots" are now lobbying or otherwise
working in some of these alternative arenas to preserve their earlier
gains in the courts.' Thus, while the "have-nots" might have lost
ground in litigation, as Nielsen and Albiston suggest, it is possible that
they have gained ground in some of these other arenas and are
therefore no worse off than they were in the mid-1970s. Have
sufficient and effective substitutes to litigation to promote the
interests of the "have-nots" emerged in the United States since the
mid-1970s?
Although this is largely a rhetorical question and is beyond the
scope this Comment, the sociopolitical and economic changes that
have occurred since the mid-1970s render an affirmative answer quite
unlikely. It is more likely that many of the available channels for the
articulation and promotion of "have-nots' " interests have narrowed
simultaneously since the mid-1970s, due to the same background
changes that might have rendered the judiciary/litigation a less
effective arena for pursuing these interests. The dual trends of
deregulation and greater reliance on market processes for the
commitment and their African-American clients' interest in the quality of their children's

education); Galanter, supra note 31 (noting that the "Haves" tend consistently to come
out ahead of the "Have-nots" in litigation).
36. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 29, at vii.
37.

See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM:

A

THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 3 (1978) ("[A]dvocacy is not restricted

to courts; it takes place wherever important decisions are made affecting the interests of
client groups-in all branches and levels of government, in the media, in the private
sector."); see also Southworth, supra note 13; supra text accompanying note 13 (noting the
various arenas within which law and public policy are debated and formed).
38. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
39. Id.

40. A good recent example is the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights, which is
lobbying for extension of the Voting Rights Act.
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allocation of goods and services coupled with "the intense political

resistance to [redistributive] economic policies in the United States"41
have probably increased the advantage of the "haves" relative to the

"have-nots" across all arenas and not just in the judiciary since the
mid-1970s. Like the courts, processes in these other arenas are not
immune to the effects of underlying sociopolitical and economic
changes, since rights/interest promotion depends on an entire support
structure, which in turn is dependent upon the underlying
sociopolitical and economic environment.4 2
In short, it seems possible that market, legal and political
failures vis-A-vis the "have-nots" have coalesced, making "have-nots"
43
worse off in all sociopolitical and legal forums since the mid-1970s.
While this broader question is beyond the scope of Nielsen's and
Albiston's Article, a significant contribution of their Article is that it
inevitably raises this important, albeit troubling, question.

41. See Gary Burtless & Christopher Jencks, American Inequality and Its
Consequences, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 61, 96 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2003).
42. See Bell, supra note 35, at 514 ("The problem of unjust laws ...is almost
invariably a problem of distribution of political and economic power."); see also supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
43. Perhaps the most compelling evidence in support of this assertion is the increased
income inequality in the United States since 1973, which has coincided with deregulation
and laissez faire economic policies. See Burless & Jencks, supra note 41, at 64, 96
(presenting evidence that income inequality, along various measures, has increased in the
United States since 1973). Burtless and Jencks suggest that one of the most disturbing
potential effects of greater income inequality in the United States is an increase in the
degree of political inequality among Americans, with relatively greater political power
accruing to the "well-to-do," who are probably less likely to support redistributive policies.
See id. at 98.
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